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Recent Cases
COPYRIGHT-INFRINGEMENT-BURLESQUE AS "FAIR USE"
Benny v. Loew's Inc.'
In October 1945 appellant, Jack Benny, broadcast a fifteen minute parody or
burlesque of appellee, Loew's, copyrighted movie, "Gaslight." Consent for this broad-
cast had been obtained. Six years later, in January 1952, Benny televised "Autolight,"
another burlesque of "Gaslight," without consent. Loew's promptly notified Benny
they considered the program an infringement; Benny replied that his burlesque was
"fair use." No action was brought until June 1953, when Benny commenced remaking
"Autolight," this time in the form of a film to be shown on his television program.
An injunction to restrain Benny from using the television film was granted by the
federal district court.2 On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held,
affirmed. A substantial taking of copyright material by use of burlesque constitutes
an infringement; this burlesque was not "fair use." The Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari April 29, 1957.3
This is a case of first impression and is of importance due to the expansion of
television and its quest for material, which often conflicts with that of the motion
picture industry. Burlesque is widely used in the field of entertainment and this
decision could restrict future comedy programs in television as well as those in other
fields of entertainment.
Copyright today is entirely statutory4 and was created in this country through
the power vested in Congress by the United States Constitution.5 The copyright
statute gives the creator exclusive rights to his copyright material,0 but this has
been somewhat limited by judicial decisions.7 The courts, in limiting this statutory
monopoly, hold that "fair use" may be made of the copyright material. However,
the courts have not been consistent in deciding what constitutes "fair use." They
seem to confuse infringement, the violation of the copyright, with "fair use,"8 a
defense to an injunction for infringement.9
1. 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956).
2. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal.
1955).
3. Columbia Broadcasting System v. Loew's Inc., 353 U.S. 946 (1957).
4. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co., 59 F.2d 70,
72 (1st Cir. 1932).
5. Art. I, § 8, para. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
6. 35 STAT. 1075 (1909), as amended, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
7. Toksvig v. Bruce Pub. Co., 181 F.2d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1950); Hill v. Whalen &
Martell, Inc., 220 Fed. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
8. Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Pub. Corp., 31 F. Supp. 817, 818 (S.D.N.Y.
1940).
9. New York Tribune v. Otis & Co., 39 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). See also
Note, Parody and Copyright Infringement, 56 COLum. L. REv. 585, 593 (1956).
1
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1958
RECENT CASES
Infringement occurs when it is shown that a valuable and substantial part of
the copyright material has been copied without authority.' 0 The court in the instant
case found infringement by a detailed comparison of the scripts and a viewing of
the two programs." Infringement was not a major issue in this case however, as
the trial court recognized that this point was virtually conceded by the appellant.12
After determining infringement, it is necessary to see whether the doctrine of
"fair use" applies to the situation. "'Fair use' is a privilege in others than the owner
of a copyright, to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner, without his
consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright.' 3
This use is not provided for in the statute, but has been authorized by judicial deci-
sions from the beginning.14
Determination of "fair use" has been termed as "... the most troublesome in
the whole law of copyright ..."15 Emphasis, in this determination, is placed on the
quantity of material taken, the competitive or superseding effect of the works, the
economic detriment, and/or the lessening of demand for the original.16 In a recent
decision, a court decided "fair use" by saying that the ".... law looks to the character
of the two works, the nature and object of the selections made, and quantity and
value of the materials used."17
Applying the above tests, the courts have held that quotation for the purpose
of review and criticism was "fair use."'s The use of an eight line chorus in an article
supporting a professional football team was found to be "fair use."19 On the other
hand, when a pamphlet quoted three lines from a copyrighted book, the court said
that such use was not fair.20
In deciding whether burlesque was "fair use," the court in the instant case,
approving the language of the trial court, said "... 'parodized or burlesque taking is
to be treated no differently from any other appropriation... .' "21 However, this same
trial court seven months later, in another opinion by the same judge stated:
"Since a burlesquer must make a sufficient use of the original to recall or
conjure up the subject matter being burlesqued, the law permits more exten-
sive use of the protectible portion of a copyrighted work in the creation of
a burlesque of that work than in the creation of other fictional or dramatic
works not intended as a burlesque of the original" 2 2
10. Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 84 (6th Cir. 1943).
11. 239 F.2d at 536.
12. 131 F. Supp. at 171.
13. Note, 15 So. CAMuF. L. Rzv. 249 (1942).
14. Cases cited note 7 supra.
15. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
16. Cases cited notes 8, 9, and 10 supra. See also Yankwich, What Is Fair Use?,
22 U. Cm. L. Rav. 203, 213 (1954).
17. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 354
(S.D. Cal. 1955).
18. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, No. 4,901 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
19. Karl v. Curtis Pub. Co., 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
20. Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa.
1938).
21. 239 F.2d at 537.
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This case involved the Sid Caesar television program, with Caesar's "From Hero
to Obscurity" a burlesque on the movie, "From Here to Eternity." The trial court
found the following similarities: locale, settings, situations, principal members of
the cast, incident, development, treatment, and expression.2 3 Yet the court says
this ".... does not constitute a taking of a substantial portion....
24
In reading the two cases, one wonders why different results were reached at
the trial level. Was it due to Judge Yankwich's article2O asking "for an expanded
test" in the field of "fair use"? Did the younger comedian, Sid Caesar, appeal more
to the judge's sense of humor than the older, Jack Benny? 20 Or was there actually
a measurable difference in the amount of taking?
Even if there were some difference in the amount of material taken, it is difficult
to see why different results should be reached. Each burlesque copied material, the
original play was apparent in both cases, and demand was not lessened for the
original. Burlesque, due to its natural infringing nature, should either be a defense
per se, or no defense at all. This is based on the fact that burlesque either causes
injury, or it does not If injury was done to "Gaslight," then like injury occurred to
"From Here to Eternity." It is submitted that burlesque causes no appreciable injury
to the copyright material and therefore should fall under the doctrine of "fair use"
and be a defense per se. Until the boundaries of "fair use" are determined in this
and related fields, we must agree with Judge Morrow, who over sixty years ago said:
"What constitutes a 'fair use' is often a very difficult question to answer."
2 7
STA rnt A. GRan
CORPORATE DISSOLUTION-SURVIVAL OF REMEDY
Levy v. Lieblingl
A Kentucky corporation had a money decree entered in its favor against defend-
ant in 1939 in Illinois but this judgment was never satisfied. The corporation pro-
ceeded voluntarily to dissolve in 1942, the pertinent statutes2 requiring the corpora-
tion to collect its assets and pay or provide for the payment of its debts, the re-
maining assets to be distributed to the shareholders according to their respective
rights and interests. A certificate of dissolution, issued to the corporation by the
Secretary of State, was properly recorded on November 28, 1942. In 1955 the former
shareholders joined with the corporation in an action in district court to recover
the amount owing on the judgment ($28,862.26) plus interest thereon and costs.
23. Id. at 352.
24. Ibid.
25. Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. B. REv.
1130, 1152 (1955).
26. Caesar is 35, Benny is 63.
27. Simms v. Stanton, 75 Fed. 6, 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896).
1. 238 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1956).
2. Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 271.500-.540 (1956); cf. §§ 351A60-A80, RSMo 1949; ILL. Aim.
STAT. c. 32, §§ 157.75-.81 (Smith-Hurd 1954) (similar wording).
[Vol. 23
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Defendant's motion to quash was allowed as to the corporation for want of capa-
city to sue but denied as to the individual plaintiffs. Defendant failed to answer
further whereupon the court entered a default judgment against defendant sixteen
years after judgment originally was entered. On appeal, held, affirmed. The former
shareholders were not lacking in capacity to enforce a judgment received by them
as an asset of a now dissolved corporation.
Kentucky statutes provide for an extension of corporate life for a period of two
years after dissolution, whether by issuance of a certificate of dissolution, decree of
court, or by expiration of the corporate period of duration.3 The object is to save
unimpaired for this added period only, remedies available to or against the corpora-
tion, its directors, or shareholders, for any right or cause existing, or any liability
incurred, prior to such dissolution. The problem here, then, was whether the share-
holders had a remedy for a right or cause of action that was in existence before the
dissolution of the corporation.
If, upon the voluntary dissolution of the corporation, the assets are distributed
as required by statute, 4 it would seem that the distribution would take place prior
to dissolution, since the statute provides that the corporation shall distribute its assets
either in cash or in kind5 before the state issues a certificate of dissolution.6 In this
case, then, if the statute had been complied with, the unsatisfied judgment, as an
asset of the corporation, would have gone to the shareholders prior to dissolution, and,
having existed as a shareholders' right or cause of action before dissolution, their
remedy thereon, saved for a two year period, would thereafter be lost to the share-
holders.
If the statute is not complied with and the remaining assets are not distributed
by the corporation to its shareholders, then, according to the cases, title to the assets
passes to the shareholders by operation of law upon or after dissolution.7 In the
instant case, then, the judgment coming to the shareholders after dissolution, there
was no remedy available to the shareholders for a right existing prior to such dissolu-
tion, to be lost by failure to bring suit within two years after the date of dissolution.
3. Ky. RFv. STAT. § 271.585 (1956); cf. § 351.565, RSMo 1949; ILL. ANN. STAT. c.
32, § 157.94 (Smith-Hurd 1954) (similar wording).
4. Ky. Rxv. STAT. § 271.515 (1956).
5. Ibid.
6. Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 271.535-.540 (1956).
7. Kash v. Lewis, 224 Ky. 679, 6 S.W.2d 1098 (1928) (property of business
corporation vests in stockholders on dissolution, subject to corporate liabilities); cf.
Milgram v. Jiffy Equipment Co., 362 Mo. 1194, 247 S.W.2d 668 (1952) (on dissolution
and payment of expenses and corporate liabilities, title to corporate assets vests
automatically in shareholders and their right to receive the remaining assets is ab-
solute; a shareholder may sue at law and recover his proportionate share of corporate
assets); Goodstein Millinery Company v. Berkley, Inc., 324 ]1M. App. 229, 57 N.E.2d 756
(1944) (on dissolution of a corporation, its assets belong to the shareholders subject
to the rights of corporate creditors); Wittich v. Wittich, 263 S.W. 1001 (Mo. 1924);
16 FLETcHER, PRrvATE CORPORATIONS § 8134 (1957 Supp.); 13 Ams. JuR., Corporations §
1352 (1938). Contra, Simms v. Coastal Oil & Fuel Corp., 200 La. 1080, 9 So. 2d 428
(1942).
4
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Accordingly, suit may be brought within the usual statutory period allowed for judg-
ments.8 This is the result the court seems o reach in this case, allowing a recovery
some sixteen years after dissolution.
However, in the course of its opinion the court stated,
"... We think it can be hardly open to doubt but that the stockholders,
at the time Imperial became extinct for all purposes including the two-vear
period allowed by Kentucky law for the winding up of its business, acquired
the title to and became the owners of the judgment which they now seek
to enforce."9 (Emphasis added.)
This language is unfortunate and seems .to be contrary to the Kentucky cases cited
by the court. The corporation could have enforced the judgment within the two year
period but failed to do so. Moreover, the shareholders could have initiated a deriva-
tive suit to enforce the corporate right, but failed to do so. A fter the expiration of
the two year period, the remedy for the right was lost, and if, as the quoted lan-
guage has it, the right only then passed to the shareholders, it would seem that It
came to them subject to the same attribute of urienforceability which it had as a
corporate asset.
DoNALD HOEL
EQUITY-RESCISSION OF LAND SALE
TRANSACTION-FRAUD, MENTAL INCAPACITY
AND INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION
Hudspeth v. Zom 1
Plaintiffs Hudspeth (husband and wife) conveyed to defendant Zorn 230 acres
of land for $1,000.00, following his representations as to the value and condition of
the land. Plaintiffs had not seen the land for about ten years and had no knowledge
of land values. Zorn, having farmed the land for about twenty-seven years, had
plaintiffs' complete confidence in the use of the land and the profits thereby derived.
Mr. Hudspeth was subsequently found to be of unsound mind and a guardian was
appointed. Mrs. Hudspeth and the guardian brought this suit to set aside the deed
and to recover one-fourth of the crops raised as rent for the use of the land. The
Supreme Court of Missouri held that Mr. Hudspeth was mentally incapable of execut-
ing the deed, that the Hudspeths had relied on Zorn's representations as to the value
and condition of the land, that these representations were untrue, and that the con-
sideration paid by Zorn was grossly inadequate. The final decree set aside the deed,
ordered the consideration (which had been paid into court) returned to Zorn, and
denied a recovery for rent due to certain improvements made by Zorn.
8. Twenty years is allowed in Illinos. ILL. Ax. STAT., c. 83, § 12 (Smith-Hurd
1956).
9. 238 F.2d at 507.
1. 292 S.W.2d 271 (Mo. 1956).
[Vol.' 23
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Three major factors involved made this a strong case for setting aside the deed:
1) inadequacy of consideration; 2) mental incapacity to execute the deed; and 3)
false representations and reliance thereon. The presence of all three, interrelated as
they are, raises a question as to the minimum grounds sufficient to justify such an
action. Let us consider these factors individually.
I. INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION
In Missouri inadequacy of consideration, standing alone, does not furnish suffici-
ent basis for invalidating a deed unless it is so great that under the circumstances it
amounts to fraud. 2 Relief is granted not for inadequacy of consideration but on
grounds of fraud.3
Despite dictum to this effect no Missouri case could, be found in which gross in-
adequacy of consideration, without other indication of inequity, was sufficient to
set aside a deed. This justifies a conclusion that inadequacy of consideration, in and
of itself, serves merely as a badge of fraud demanding careful scrutiny, and may, in
conjunction with other inequitable conditions, constitute grounds for rescinding a
conveyancee 4
11. MENTAL INCAPACITY TO EXECUTE DEED
The weight .of authority supports the view that conveyances of an insane person
are voidable, subject to certain conditions. They may be disaffirmed by him or in
his behalf, but they are not void, and they remain in full force until disaffirmed. 5
Where such a conveyance has been executed in good faith, and for a fair considera-
tion, it will not be set aside unless the parties can be restored to their original
position.6
Great mental weakness in the grantor, although not amounting to incapacity as
such, when coupled with a gross inadequacy of consideration, is sufficient grounds
for setting aside a conveyance.7 From this it would appear that the combination in
the instant case of Hudspeth's mental incapacity plus the extreme inadequacy of
consideration would be a sufficient ground for setting aside the deed.
2. Meyer v. Schaub, 364 Mo. 711, 720, 266 S.W.2d 620, 624 (1954); Frey v.
Onstott, 357 Mo. 721, 730, 210 S.W.2d 87, 93 (1948); Wigginton v. Burns, 216 S.W.
756 (Mo. 1919).
3. Frey v. Onstott, supra note 2; Bussen Realty Co. v. Benson, 349 Mo. 58, 159
S.W.2d 813 (1942); see KER, FRAUD AxD MISTAKE 187 (1872).
4. Meyer v. Schaub, supra note 2; Frey v. Onstott, supra note 2; Bussen Realty
Co. v. Benson, supra note 3.
5. State ex rel. United Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Shain, 349 Mo. 460, 469, 162 S.W.2d
255, 259 (1942); Jamison v. Culligan, 151 Mo. 410, 52 S.W. 224 (1899).
6. State ex rel. United Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Shan, supra note 5, at 470, 162 S.W.2d
at 260.
7. Wright v. Brown, 242 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. 1951); Colquitt v. Lowe, 184 S.W.2d
420, 421 (Mo. 1945); Jones v. Belsche, 238 Mo. 524, 141 S.W. 1130 (1911); Ryan v.
Ryan, 174 Mo. 279, 73 S.W. 494 (1903).
19581
6
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III. FALSE REPRESENTATION AND RELIANCE THEREON
The court in the instant case states that the real issue involved is the right to the
rescission of a transaction induced by false representations and the decision is pre-
dominantly based thereon.8 Where a party is induced to enter into a transaction with
another party, when under no duty to do so, by means of the latter's fraud or
material misrepresentation, the transaction is voidable as against the latter.0
It appears that Zorn had full control of the farm, decided how it was to be
farmed, rented part of it to others, sold the crops, determined the Hudspeths' share,
and sent them the proceeds. There was a complete reliance upon him in these mat-
ters indicating a confidential fiduciary relationship.10 This relationship of trust and
confidence is important in finding reasonable reliance on the part of the Hudspeths.1l
Moreover, Mr. Hudspeth's mental weakness, which placed him at a distinct dis-
advantage in dealing with Zorn, simplified the finding of reliance.' 2
It is not necessary to find an intent to deceive on the part of Zorn or even a
knowledge of the falsity of his representations. All that need be shown is that the
representations were false and actually misled the person to whom they were made."a
There is no requirement that the parties be restored to their original position.
Here the court finds material misrepresentation and reasonable reliance based
upon the confidential fiduciary relationship existing between the Hudspeths and
Zorn. This would suffice for setting aside the deed without resort to the other in-
equitable factors involved.
CONCLUSION
We have seen that inadequacy of consideration, standing alone, does not constitute
a sufficient ground for setting aside a deed. Mental incapacity without other cir-
cumstances is likewise insufficient, at least unless the parties may be restored to
their original position. When combined, these two factors justify rescission. False
representation inducing reliance also appears to be ample justification for setting
aside a deed. Thus the court could have based its decree for rescission on any two of
the three inequitable factors present without regard to restoring the parties to their
original position.
G. DALE PSmAN
8. 292 S.W2d at 275.
9. Ibid.; Messina v. Greubel, 358 Mo. 439, 215 S.W.2d 456 (1948); Ellenburg v.
Edward K. Love Realty Co., 332 Mo. 766, 59 S.W.2d 625 (1933); RESTATEAMENT, COX-
TeAcTs § 476 (1932).
10. 292 S.W.2d at 275. See also, Machens v. Machens, 263 S.W.2d 724, 730 (Mo.
1954); Armstrong v. Logan, 115 Mo. 465, 22 S.W. 384 (1893).
11. Machens v. Machens, supra note 10, at 730.
12. See Schellhardt v. Schellhardt, 253 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Mo. 1952).
13. Ash Grove Lime and Portland Cement Co. v. White, 361 Mo. 1111, 1117, 238
S.W.2d 368, 372 (1951); Ellenburg v. Edward K. Love Realty Co., supra note 9, at 771,
59 S.W.2d at 627; Peters v. Lohnan, 156 S.W. 783, 788 (Spr. Ct. App. 1913); Derby v.
Donahoe, 208 Mo. 684, 707, 106 S.W. 632, 639 (1907).
[Vol. 23
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FUTURE INTERESTS-CONTINGENT REMAINDERS
IMPLIED CONDITION OF SURVIVORSHIP
In re Trust Estate of Yeaterl
The will of John J. Yeater provided that after the death of the testator's widow
(who was given an estate for life) the property was to be distributed in four equal
parts: one-fourth to each of the testator's two sons, Charles and Merritt, and two-
fourths to the sons in trust for their sisters, Laura and Stella. It further provided:
"Upon the death of either of my said daughters, her interest shall pass
to the heirs of her body on the attainment of their respective majorities and
shall not vest until then, and should she have no such heirs, to her sister and
brothers and their heirs."
2
After the death of the widow, the sons acquired their own quarter-interests and
assumed their duties as trustees of the others. Stella died survived by two bodily
heirs. Charles and Merritt subsequently assigned all their interests under the Laura
trust to Stella's children. Charles died survived by issue. Merritt and Laura died
in that order, neither survived by issue.
The trial court ruled that, by virtue of the assignment from Charles and Merritt,
Stella's two children were entitled to all the remainder of the Laura Yeater trust
estate. On appeal by the issue of Charles the Kansas City Court of Appeals reversed
the judgment and entered a decree granting half to the issue of Charles and half to
the children of Stella. All parties agreed that the will created alternative contingent
remainders, the first alternative being to pass the estate to such of Laura's bodily
heirs as reached majority, and, in default thereof, to "her sister and brothers and
their heirs." The court of appeals accepted the additional contention of the appellants
that, besides the above contingencies, the brothers' remainder interests were subject
to the further condition of survivorship. As neither assignor survived Laura, the
court held that the assignors' contingent interests never vested and that their heirs
took by purchase rather than by descent. The court arrived at this conclusion by
construing the words "and their heirs" as words of purchase, designating a group
which was to take upon Laura's death in the event that the other sister and brothers
were then deceased. The effect of this construction was to make it necessary for
Charles and Merritt to survive Laura for their interests to vest. As Laura died without
issue, thus causing failure of the first alternative, and as neither brother survived her,
which was a failure to fulfill the condition precedent to their taking, the court found
that the remainder in Laura's trust estate passed directly by purchase to this third
group.
The case thus turned on two issues: (1) whether a future interest, contingent
on some other fortuitous event, should be construed as subject by implication to the
additional condition that the devisee survive the preceding particular estate, and
1. 295 S.W.2d 581 (K.C. Ct. App. 1956).
2. Id. at 583.
8
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(2) whether the words "and their heirs" in a will should be construed to be words of
purchase3 or limitation.4 Since future interests can be created in personalty as well
as in real property,5 an interest analogous to a remainder after a life estate is valid.0
Thus the fact that personal property is involved in the Laura Yeater estate does not
alter the result from that which would be reached if the litigation concerned real
property.
Regarding the first issue, the Supreme Court of Missouri in Tapley v. Dill,7
construing a similar will, held that the devisee took an alternative contingent re-
mainder, freely alienable and devisable and not subject to any condition that he
survive the preceding particular estate. The court pointed out that where the con-
tingency refers to the time of possession and not the time for title to pass or for the
determination of the person taking, it is not logically sound to consider the contingent
remainder subject to an implied condition that the donee survive the preceding estate.
This view is in accord with the great weight of authority.8 In the past a few jurisdic-
tions have held otherwise9 but one of them has since remedied the situation by
statute.10
The Kansas City Court of Appeals, having interpreted the desire of John J.
Yeater as being to keep the property in his blood line as long as possible, and know-
ing that they should so construe the will as to give effect to this desire,11 apparently
sought some means of circumventing the doctrine of Tapley v. Dill. In so doing they
seized upon the words "and their heirs," holding that the intended meaning was "her
sister and brothers or their heirs." As the heirs were held to have acquired alternative
contingent remainders by purchase (which remainders would vest upon the double
contingency of Charles predeceasing Laura and her dying without issue) it became
necessary for Charles to survive Laura in order for his contingent interest in her
trust estate to vest. However, in the attempt to by-pass Tapley v. Dill, it seems that
the court ran afoul of another well settled doctrine in Missouri, that even when used
as to personal property and not necessary to create an interest of the duration desired,
the word "heirs" is considered as a word of limitation and not of purchase unless the
will shows clearly that it is used to designate a new class of beneficiaries.12 It can
be questioned whether any such meaning was clearly intended in the Yeater will.
JoHN CHARLES CROW
3. BLAcK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951) (words which denote the person who
is to take the estate).
4. BLACK, op. cit. supra note 3 (words which have the effect of marking the
duration of an estate).
5. 1 SIEs & S t=, FuTuRE INTE, sTs § 360 (2d ed. 1956); Buaiy, REAL PROPERTY§ 308 (1943); see 2 RESTATEmmT, PROPERTY § 153 (1936) (defining the term future
interest to include an interest in a thing other than land). See also 2 RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY 814-20 (1936).
6. Smith v. Bell, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29 (1832); Wahl v. Wahl, 357 Mo. 89, 206S.W.2d 334 (1947); Burch v. Horn, 236 Mo. App. 388, 156 S.W.2d 929 (K.C. Ct. App.
1941); Hitchcock v. Clendennin, 6 Mo. App. 99 (St. L. Ct. App. 1878).
7. 358 Mo. 824, 217 S.W.2d 369 (1949), discussed in Eckhardt, Tax Titles, 15
Mo. L. REv. 376, 387 (1950). Testator left to Joe Tapley, as trustee, two one-fourth
[Vol. 23
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INSURANCE-ACCIDENT-VOLUNTARY EXPOSURE TO DANGER
Baker v. National Life & Accident Insurance Co.1
The beneficiary sued under the double indemnity provision of a life insurance
policy which provided for additional payment "upon receipt of due proof that the
death of the insured resulted directly and independently of all other causes, from
bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent, and accidental means . . ."
The insured had invited a friend to shoot a pepper can off his head at close range.
Immediately before the gun was fired, the can slipped forward, and when he jerked
his head up to balance it, the bullet entered his forehead, causing instant death. The
company's only defense was that death did not result from accidental means. The
supreme court affirmed dismissal of plaintiff's cause. It declared that the company
insured for death caused by accidental means rather than for death commonly thought
to be an accident; and where the injury is the natural result of an act in which the
insured intentionally engages it is not produced by accidental means.
Insurance companies in double indemnity provisions of life policies and in straight
shares of his estate, one each in trust for his grandson, Harry Mitchell, and his
bodily heirs, and his granddaughter, Mary Mitchell, and her bodily heirs. It was
further provided that if Mary died without heirs of her body, her trust estate was
to become part of Harry's, and in case he should at that time be deceased, then it
was to become the prbperty of Joe Tapley. The latter died leaving his estate to his
widow. Mary and Harry died in that order, neither survived by issue. Joe Tapley's
widow was decreed owner of all of the trust estate on the theory that her husband,
at his death, owned a contingent remainder in the estates, and this interest was
capable of being devised to her.
8. 2 SnIEs & S uH, op. cit. supra note 5, § 594 ("Certainly there is no rule of
law that a condition precedent of survivorship is implied wherever a gift is subject
to any other condition precedent." This would make every contingent future interest
inalienable which in the hands of the original devisee or legatee); Fulton v. Teager,
183 Ky. 381, 209 S.W. 535 (1919); Fisher v. Wagner, 109 Md. 243, 71 Atl. 999 (1909);
Tapley v. Dill, supra note 7; Colony v. Colony, 97 N.H. 386, 89 A.2d 909 (1952); In re
Wilkinson's Will, 114 N.Y.S.2d 423 (Surr. Ct. 1952); In re Massey's Estate, 235 Pa.
289, 83 Atl. 1087 (1912); Loring v. Arnold, 15 R.L 428, 8 Atl. 335 (1887).
9. 5 AaRicAN LA v OF PROPERTY § 21.25 (Casner ed. 1952); First Nat'l Bank v.
Somers, 106 Conn. 267, 137 Atl. 737 (1927); In re Coots' Estate, 253 Mich. 208, 234
N.W. 141 (1931), cert. denied sub. nom. Delbridge v. Oldfield, 284 U.S. 665 (1931).
10. MICH. STAT. AxN. § 26.47 (1957). This statute, enacted in 1931, changed the
rule of the Coots case, supra note 9, so that there is no such inference of a require-
ment of survival.
11. § 468.620, RSMo 1949; Ott v. Pickard, 361 Mo. 823, 237 S.W.2d 109 (1951);
In re Bernheimer's Estate, 352 Mo. 91, 176 S.W.2d 15 (1943); First Trust Co. v. Myers,
351 Mo. 899, 174 S.W.2d 378 (1943); Gannett v. Shepley, 351 Mo. 286, 172 S.W.2d 857
(1943); Graves v. Graves, 349 Mo. 722, 163 S.W.2d 544 (1942); Gardner v. Vanlanding-
ham, 334 Mo. 1054, 69 S.W.2d 947 (1934).
12. Gregory v. Borders, 345 Mo. 699, 136 S.W.2d 306 (1940); Garrett v. Damron,
110 S.W.2d 1112 (Mo. 1937); Eckle v. Ryland, 256 Mo. 424, 165 S.W. 1035 (1914); Union
Trust Co. v. Curby, 255 Mo. 393, 164 S.W. 485 (1914); Roberts v. Crume, 173 Mo. 572,
73 S.W. 662 (1903); Jarboe v. Hey, 122 Mo. 341, 26 S.W. 968 (1894); Chew v. Keller, 100
Mo. 362, 13 S.W. 395 (1890).
1. 298 S.W.2d 715 (Tenn. 1957).
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accident policies have adopted the term accidental means to restrict the risk assumed 2
to those cases where the cause of death or injury was accidental.3 It is not enough that
the loss was accidental in the sense of being unexpected or unforeseen. A majority of
the courts have followed this distinction between cause and result.4 A substantial
minority dissents, reasoning that: (1) the words should be given their common
meaning as understood by the average man when he takes out an accident policy with
all ambiguities resolved against the insurer, and (2) the distinction is technical and
if carried to extreme nothing physical in nature could be an accident.5
The Missouri supreme court in Caldwell v. Travelers' Ins. Co.0 accepted the
majority or less liberal view. The essence of the Missouri test is that where the
insured intentionally does an act which produces an unusual result, the loss there-
from is not caused by accidental means, unless "a mischance, slip, or mishap occurs in
doing the act itself."
Three distinct classes of cases can be found to which this test has been applied.
The first of these is the self-inflicted harm7 or suicide case. It has been held that if
the insured commits suicide while sane there can be no recovery, while if insane
such death is by accidental means.8 In the former case the insured has full control
over the causes of death and therefore they cannot be accidental. If the insured is
insane the insured's lack of control brings the causes into the area of the accidental.
Those cases in which the insured voluntarily engages in acts which are inherently
dangerous and which are likely to produce loss represent the second group considered
under the Missouri rule. Their facts are analogous to the Baker case. If the insured
is an aggressor the test used is not that of negligence, but, it seems, whether the
insured should have expected the quality of resistance he got. An important factor
considered is the ferociousness of the insured's attack.9 Recovery is denied more
2. VANCE, INsuRANcE § 180, at 944 (3d ed. 1951).
3. 5 COUCH, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 1137, at 3975 (1929).
4. VANCE, op cit. supra note 2, at 950; 45 C.J.S. § 753b (1946); Annot., 166 AIL.R.
469 (1947).
5. Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491 (1934) (Cardozo, J., dis-
senting. The minority view is sometimes called the New York rule where it was
firmly established by Cardozo); Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n,
295 N.Y. 294, 67 N.E2d 248 (1946); Lewis v. Ocean Acc. & Guarantee Corp., 224 N.Y.
18, 120 N.E. 56 (1918); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Green, 172 Okla. 591, 46
P.2d 372 (1935); O'ConneU v. New York Life Ins. Co., 220 Wisc. 61, 264 N.W. 253 (1936).
6. 305 Mo. 619, 267 S.W. 907 (1924). This leading Missouri case adopts the rule
laid down in Mutual Accident Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100 (1889).
7. See New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943)
(clarifying the problem that an accident occurs from the standpoint of the one suffer-
ing rather than from the one inflicting it.) In suicide cases these two ways of looking
at the loss are combined.
8. Lemmon v. Continental Casualty Co., 350 Mo. 1107, 169 S.W.2d 920 (1943 )-
Woodlock v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 225 S.W. 994 (Mo. 1920). See generally Annot., 16
A.L.R. 1402 (1922).
9. Compare Camp v. John Hancock Mutual Ins. Co., 165 S.W.2d 277 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1942) with Podesta v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 150 S.W.2d 596 (St. L. Ct. App.
1941). For a possible exception to the rule see Lovelace v. Travelers' Protective
Ass'n, 126 Mo. 104, 28 S.W. 877 (1894) (however, there the risk assumed was broader
the policy covering an "accident" and not "accidental means").
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strictly on a negligence basis in the instance of the insured's foolhardy act, but usually
the negligence must be of a high degree so that the insured is said to be held
responsible for the natural and probable consequences of his act.1 0 The courts view
the loss from this type of conduct as foreseeable and not in any sense the result of
accidental means.
Difficulty arises in the interpretation of accidental means in the third class of
cases, for here the insured does something not likely to produce injury, but which,
nevertheless, does. The slip, mishap, or mischance may sometimes be easily discerned
in the intentional act," but if it cannot be found recovery is denied.12 When the
Missouri test is applied to the close case, its efficacy seems to have been weakened. 13
The Missouri supreme court has held death by sunstroke (barring intentional over-
exposure) to be by accidental means.14 But the United States Supreme Court in
Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co.,15 also purportedly following the before-men-
tioned majority rule, has come to an opposite conclusion. These decisions cannot, it
seems, be reconciled. The Missouri court simply has allowed a more equitable result
in sunstroke cases.1 6
The decision here noted represents a class of cases in which, because of the nature
of the insured's conduct, the courts (recognizing the distinction between "accident"
and "accidental means") have been able to devise a relatively uniform standard. The
Missouri test denies recovery if the insured's actions are such that the resulting loss
follows naturally and probably from them. The injury is foreseeable and not in any
sense caused by accidental means. Negligence per se is not spoken of in the decisions,
10. Callahan v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 357 Mo. 187, 207 S.W.2d 279(1947); Perringer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 241 Mo. App. 521, 244 S.W.2d 607(Spr. Ct. App. 1951); Pope v. Business Men's Assur. Co., 131 S.W.2d 887 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1939). For another possible exception, see McKeon v. Nat'l Casualty Co., 216 Mo.
App. 507, 270 S.W. 707 (St. L. Ct. App. 1925) (again the policy covered the broader
term "accidental event." Also the case can be distinguished on its facts for though
the insured fired back at police, they had originally, while not in uniform and without
a warrant, given chase, firing over the insured's head). To the insured the event of
death was an accident.
11. Gasperino v. Prudential Ins. Co., 107 S.W.2d 819 (K.C. Ct. App. 1957) (insured
did intend to drink water, but not water containing typhoid germs); Jennings v.
National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 226 Mo. App. 777, 46 S.W.2d 226 (K.C. Ct. App. 1932)(no question that the loss occurred from accidental means when spark from welder's
torch hit insured's eye).
12. Zach v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 272 S.W. 995 (St. L. Ct. App. 3925) (no re-
covery where insured died from pneumonia following normal tooth extraction).
13. Cameron v. Mass. Protective Ass'n, 220 Mo. App. 780, 275 S.W. 988 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1925) (recovery granted when insured broke pimple with sharp instrument and
later died of pneumonia caused by blood poisoning. The court cited a leading
minority case, Lewis v. Ocean Acc. & Guarantee Corp., supra note 5, as authority).
14. Elbe v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 S.W.2d 302 (St. L. Ct. App. 1941)(see the separate concurring opinion of Anderson, J., at 307); Layton v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 89 S.W.2d 576 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936); Farmer v. Railway Mail Ass'n, 227
Mo. App. 1082, 57 S.W.2d 744 (St. L. Ct. App. 1933).
15. 291 U.S. 491 (1934) (citing the Barry case, supra note 6).
16. Kisch, Accidental Means, 367 INs. L.J. 545, 547 (1953). See generally Annot.,
17 A.L.R. 1197 (1922).
17. See Note, 13 Tnw. L.Q. 125, 131 (1938).
18. Annot., 166 A.L.R. at 477.
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but usually a high degree of it is present. In the not so clear case, the Missouri deci-
sions committed to the majority view have in some instances crossed over to the
minority view confusing this branch of the law. Solutions have been offered,17 but
it has been suggested the essence of the problem might be that the term "accidental
means" is like the term "proximate cause" and incapable of precise judicial defini-
tion.' 8 Progress in this field of the law will be made either by judicial interpretation,
a more lengthy insurance contract, or public regulation, but the risk assumed should
be commensurate with the premium paid, whatever method is used.
HAMr D. PEzM
NECESSARIES-RIGHT OF WIFE TO SUE
HUSBAND FOR REIMBURSEMENT
Smith -v. Smith'
Plaintiff-wife's petition charged that defendant-husband abandoned her without
cause and did not thereafter contribute anything for her support, by reason of which
plaintiff was required to expend her own funds for the necessities of life. Plaintiff
asked that defendant be required to reimburse her for the money she had so ex-
pended. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's petition because of failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. On appeal, held, reversed. Since the disabilities
of the wife have been removed by the married women's acts, there is no reason why
she cannot now maintain this action against her husband.
A husband, at common law, has the duty to support his wife.2 This duty is
'created by the marriage relation and depends upon no other theory of law to sup-
port it.3 The liability continues even though the wife has a separate estate and is
capable of supporting herself.4 It is not ended by a separation of the parties, unless
the separation be the fault of the wife alone.5 It is not ended by the adultery of the
1. 300 S.W.2d 275 (Spr. Ct. App. 1957).
2. Semon v. Illgenfritz, 223 Mo. App. 546, 551, 15 S.W.2d 912, 915 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1929); Youngs v. Youngs, 78 Mo. App. 225, 228 (K.C. Ct. App. 1899); Pidgin v.
Cram, 8 N.H. 350, 351 (1836); Ellenbogen v. Slocum, 66 Misc. 611, 121 N.Y. Supp. 1110
(Munic. Ct. 1910).
3. Bergh v. Warner, 47 Minn. 250, 252, 50 N.W. 77, 78 (1891); Gately Outfitting
Co. v. Vinson, 182 S.W. 133, 134 (K.C. Ct. App. 1916); Sauter v. Scrutchfield, 28 Mo.
App. 150, 157 (K.C. Ct. App. 1887); Hodgson v. Harris, 8 N.J. Misc. 188, 190, 149 Atl.
830, 831 (C.P. 1930).
4. Reynolds v. Rice, 224 Mo. App. 972, 975, 27 S.W.2d 1059, 1061 (K.C. Ct. App.
1930); Ott v. Hentall, 70 N.H. 231, 47 Atl. 80 (1900); Bonanno v. Bonanno, 4 N.J.
268, 72 A.2d 318 (1950); Mihalcoe v. Holub, 130 Va. 425, 107 S.E. 704 (1921).
5. Kientz v. Kientz, 104 Ark. 381, 149 S.W. 86 (1912); Schulz v. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., 331 Mo. 616, 625, 56 S.W.2d 126, 128 (1932); Audrain County v.
Muir, 297 Mo. 499, 510, 249 S.W. 383, 386 (1923); Hupp v. Hupp, 238 Mo. App. 964,
970, 194 S.W.2d 215, 219 (Spr. Ct. App. 1946); Hess v. Hess, 232 Mo. App. 825, 829, 113
S.W.2d 139, 142 (K.C. Ct. App. 1938); Frost v. Willis, 13 Vt. 202 (1841); Mihalcoe v.
Holub, supra note 4.
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wife, f cohabitation continues,( and it was not relieved by the passage of the married
women's acts or the family expense statutes.7
The husband's duty has been expressed as a duty to supply necessaries. The term
"necessaries" is not capable of exact definition, but generally it includes those things,
excluding money,8 which the husband would normally supply to the wife, measured
by the station of life which he enjoys.9
If the husband fails to supply these necessaries, the common law allows the wife-
if she can-to obtain them from a merchant, pledging the husband's credit therefor.
The merchant then can collect from or bring an action against the husband for their
reasonable value.' 0
In some jurisdictions, a third person who has loaned money to the wife for the
purchase of necessaries may recover against the husband by a bill in equity praying
to be subrogated to the rights of the merchant supplying those necessaries. The third
person must show that the money was actually used to buy the necessaries. 1
Massachusetts has refused to allow this action to a third person, saying that no
merchant acquired a right to which a third person could be subrogated.12
These methods of enforcement have obvious disadvantages for the wife, as
merchants are not anxious to involve themselves in litigation, and the wife may not
always be able to find a friend who will lend her money.
Since the passage of the married women's acts, the wife can sue the husband in
6. State v. Tierney, 17 Del. 116, 39 Atl. 774 (1897); Defelder v. Norton Bros.
Const. Co., 231 Mo. App. 296, 297, 98 S.W.2d 127, 128 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936); Miller v.
Miller, 1 N.J. Eq. 386 (Ch. 1831). But see State v. Kelly, 100 Conn. 727, 125 Atl. 95
(1924).
7. State ex rel. George v. Mitchell, 230 S.W.2d 116, 120 (Spr. Ct. App. 1950);
In re Hutcherson's Guardianship Estate, 239 Mo. App. 801, 803, 199 S.W.2d 899, 901
(St. L. Ct. App. 1947); Ruhl v. Heintze, 97 App. Div. 442, 89 N.Y. Supp. 1031 (2d
Dep't 1904).
8. Zeigler v. David, 23 Ala. 127, 138 (1853); Anderson v. Cullen, 16 Daly 15,
8 N.Y. Supp. 643 (C.P. 1890); Walker v. Simpson, 7 W. & S. 83, 42 Am. Dec. 216 (Pa.
1844); Marshall v. Perkins, 20 RI. 34, 37 Atl. 301 (1897). But see Wells v. Lachen-
meyer, 2 How. Pr. (ns.) 252 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1885); Dep't of Public Assistance v. Hurl-
butt, 39 Pa. D. & C. 466 (C.P. 1940).
9. Sulter v. Mustin, 50 Ga. 242, 244 (1873); Miller v. Miller, 241 S.W.2d 805, 806
(St. L. Ct. App. 1951); Sauter v. Scrutchfield, 28 Mo. App. 150, 157 (K.C. Ct. App.
1887); DeBrauwere v. DeBrauwere, 203 N.Y. 460, 464, 96 N.E. 722, 723 (1911).
10. Fredd v. Eves, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 385 (1846); Raynes v. Bennett, 114 Mass.
424, 428 (1874); Dorrance v. Dorrance, 257 Mo. 317, 329, 165 S.W. 783, 787 (1914);
Pfenninger v. Brevard, 129 S.W.2d 924, 925 (St. L. Ct. App. 1939); Reynolds v. Rice,
224 Mo. App. 972, 974, 27 S.W.2d 1059, 1060 (K.C. Ct. App. 1930); Sauter v. Scrutch-
field, supra note 9; Keller v. Philips, 40 Barb. 390 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1863).
11. Davis v. Fyfe, 107 Cal. App. 281, 282, 290 Pac. 468, 469 (1930); Kenyon v.
Farris, 47 Conn. 510 (1880); Reed v. Crissey, 63 Mo. App. 184, 191 (K.C. Ct. App. 1895);
Leuppie v. Executors of Osborn, 52 N.J. Eq, 637, 29 Atl. 433 (Ch. 1894); Laumeier v.
Laumeier, 237 N.Y. 357, 365, 143 N.E. 219, ?21 (1924); DeBrauwere v. DeBrauwere,
supra note 9; Walker v. Simpson, supra note 8.
12. Skinner v. Tirrell, 159 Mass. 474, 34 N.E. 692 (1893).
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law or in equity except as to personal tort,13 and some courts have allowed her to
sue even for a tort by the husband against her person.14 Therefore, since her common
law disability as to actions against her husband has been removed, some courts,
including now the Springfield Court of Appeals, have allowed the wife to enforce
her right to support more directly by an action against her husband for reimburse-
ment of monies expended out of her own estate for her support.' 5 Other courts have
refused to allow this action, chiefly on the ground that the married women's acts havo
not so emancipated the wife as to allow an action such as this,l6 or that the statutory
remedies provided the wife are exclusive of any other remedies.17
An Illinois case, cited by the Missouri court to support its holding, has ruled
that a wife may not maintain an action for reimbursement of payments voluntarily
made by her for family expenses during the time the parties were living together.18
Other courts seem to support this view.19 However, an Oklahoma decision, also cited
in the principal case, is to the effect that it makes no difference whether the parties
were living together at the time of the wife's expenditures. 20
Another factor worthy of note is that the court in the principal case held plain-
tiff's petition good even though she did not allege that she expended her money In
expectation of repayment from her husband. A Minnesota court, deciding a case in
which the parties were living together at the time of the expenditures, has ruled that
such an allegation is necessary to a valid cause of action.21
Perhaps the chief reason for the distinction which seems to have been made
between cases where the parties are living together when the expenditures are made
by the wife, and cases where the parties are separated at that time, is that in the
former there is a strong presumption of a gift by the wife, which presumption does
not naturally arise when the parties are separated. If this presumption could be
rebutted, it would seem that the wife should be able to recover in any case.22
DAVID A. E-Gamn
13. Ex parte Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 144, 226 S.W. 936, 938 (1920). In ruling on
count two of plaintiff's petition in the principal case, the court held that a wife,
living apart from her husband, can maintain an action against him for conversion
of personal property.
14. See, e.g., Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1939).
15. Bohun v. Kinasz, 124 Conn. 543, 544, 200 Atl. 1015, 1016 (1938); Spalding v.
Spalding, 361 IlM. 387, 198 N.E. 136 (1935); Kosanke v. Kosanke, 137 Minn. 115, 117, 162
N.W. 1060, 1061 (1917); DeBrauwere v. DeBrauwere, supra note 9; Sodowsky v.
Sodowsky, 51 Okla. 689, 152 Pac. 390, 393 (1915); Adler v. Adler, 171 Pa. Super. 508,
90 A.2d 389 (1952).
16. Decker v. Kedly, 148 Fed. 681 (9th Cir. 1906); Gregg v. Gregg, 199 Md. 662,
87 A.2d 581 (1952).
17. Gonzales v. Gonzales, 117 Tex. 183, 300 S.W. 20 (1927).
18. Spalding v. Spalding, supra note 15.
19. See Thomson v. Thomson, 81 Cal. App. 678, 254 Pac. 644 (1927); Agnew v.
Agnew, 67 Colo. 81, 185 Pac. 259 (1919).
20. Sodowsky v. Sodowsky, supra note 15.
21. Kosanke v. Kosanke, supra notq 15.
22. See Norris v. Barbour, 188 Va. 723, 745, 51 SX.2d 334, 343 (1949).
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NUISANCE-PARKING ON PUBLIC STREET IN FRONT OF
PLAINTIFF'S HOUSE
Loosian v. Goudreauhtl
Plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain defendant from parking oil trucks on
the street in front of plaintiff's residence while delivering oil to defendant's adjacent
property. Defendant, operating under proper license, had stored oil in underground
tanks on his property for 18 years. The oil deliveries were accomplished in approxi-
mately 35 to 45 minutes and usually were made before 6 pan. It was possible for the
trucks to be emptied while standing upon defendant's land, but it would consume
more time in consequence of the peculiar lay of the land. From time to time spots
about two feet in diameter appeared on the sidewalk as a result of oil drippings from
the hose. The street in question was a public way with each abutting owner holding
a fee to the center. The trial court determined that oil odors were annoying the
plaintiff, that these odors were emitted from the deliveries of the trucks, the storage
tanks, and the operation of the pumps, but it could not determine what ratio was
emitted by each. An injunction was granted on the ground that the odor issuing
from the oil trucks disturbed and annoyed the plaintiff. The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts affirmed. In using the public easement, defendant did infringe upon
the abutting owner's right by parking trucks for such an extended and recurring
period in front of his property. The court realized that the street where defendant
parked his truck was a public highway and that the public enjoys an easement of
travel with attendant and incidental powers in the exercise of this travel or passage
right. But conduct which cannot be termed as reasonably incidental to travel inter-
feres with the rights of the public and constitutes a wrong to the abutting owner.
The court inferred by the cases cited that an injunction is a proper remedy in such
an instance.
Massachusetts takes a stride in the nuisance field. In this age of automobiles
parking creates a dilemma, but more vital is our aged and honored protection of the
home and the reasonable enjoyment thereof. Surely the right of the abutting owner
to park in front of his property should be superior to that of the user of the public
way who repeatedly and habitually appropriates this space. When the abutting owner
frequently comes home, or is visited by friends or business callers, and there is no
space to park in front of his property as a result of the aforementioned habitual user,
the right to the reasonable enjoyment of his property has been uprooted. Picture
this legal paradox: an individual unreasonably using his property to the annoyance
of his fellow citizen can be restrained by injunctive relief, but the individual un-
reasonably using a public easement uprooting the reasonable enjoyment of his fellow
citizen's property cannot.
In defining a nuisance the Supreme Court of Missouri has stated, "There is no
exact rule or formula by which the existence of a nuisance or the non-existence of a
1. 139 N2E2d 403 (Mass. 1957).
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nuisance may be determined. 'Necessarily each case must stand upon its own special
circumstances, and no definite rule can be given that is applicable in all cases, but
when an appreciable interference with the ordinary enjoyment of property, physically,
is clearly made out as the result of a nuisance, a court of equity will never refuse
to interfere . . ."2 Reasonableness is the criterion. 3
Applying this reasonableness test, Missouri courts have enjoined various activities
as nuisances. A music shop located directly across from a clinic and hospital was
enjoined from using a loudspeaker for commercial purposes in any manner so as to
disturb the hospital personnel. 4 The operation of a parking lot built for its customers
by a grocery company, located in a residential section and used by the general public,
was enjoined as a nuisance by reason of the dirt, dust, gasoline fumes, poisonous
vapors and noises emitting therefrom to the damage and annoyance of the adjacent
residential property owner.5 A barbecue stand located in a residential area was
ordered removed because the smoke, gases, burning grease odors and fumes, coupled
with noises from automobiles late at night seriously injured a neighboring land-
owner.6 Four Missouri cases have ordered cessation of operations of a funeral home
when located in a residential area;7 such activity is said by the courts to interfere
with normal happy enjoyment of the ordinary home. In two instances the operation
of quarries has been enjoined, the dust, smoke, noise and vibration, coupled with
the danger involved, causing excessive discomfiture to surrounding residents.8
Missouri courts have recognized limitations in the use of public streets. The
Kansas City Court of Appeals stated, "The rights that arise from the establishment
of a public highway constitute a public easement to travel the same throughout its
whole surface and by any method of travel which is reasonable and proper in the
use of public roads not prohibited by law or dedicatory restrictions and available
equally to all persons, consonant with the safety and convenience of each other."0
The Supreme Court of Missouri has stated that an abutting owner has the identical
right in the use of the throughfare that the public enjoys and that he also has the
2. Crutcher v. Taystee Bread Co., 174 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Mo. 1943) (injunction
denied); see Biggs v. Griffith, 231 S.W.2d 875 (Spr. Ct. App. 1950) (injunction
granted).
3. Clinic & Hospital, Inc. v. McConnell, 241 Mo. App. 223, 236 S.W.2d 384 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1951).
4. Ibid.
5. Rhodes v. A. Moll Grocer Co., 231 Mo. App. 751, 95 S.W.2d 837 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1926).
6. Deevers v. Lando, 220 Mo. App. 50, 285 S.W. 746 (St. L. Ct. App. 1936).
7. Leffen v. Hurlbut-Glover Mortuary, Inc., 363 Mo. 1137, 257 S.W.2d 609
(1953); Clutter v. Blankenship, 346 Mo. 961, 144 S.W.2d 119 (1940); Streett v. Marshall,
316 Mo. 698, 291 S.W. 494 (1927) (en banc); Tureman v. Ketterlin, 304 Mo. 221, 263
S.W. 202 (1924).
8. Lademan v. Lamb Construction Co., 297 S.W. 184 (St. L. Ct. App. 1927);
Blackford v. Heman Construction Co., 132 Mo. App. 157, 312 S.W. 287 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1908).
9. Dillen v. Edwards, 254 S.W.2d 44, 46 (K.C. Ct. App. 1953), affd on another
point, 263 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. 1954).
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additional right of ingress and egress, which he may protect.1o It has further stated,
"an obstruction in a street or highway may be both a public and private nuisance,
and in such cases the private citizen who is specially injured may have injunctive
relief.""1 The Kansas City Court of Appeals, in granting an injunction against a
transit company for obstruction of a public street, stated, "It is not meant to say that
defendant so obstructed the way that plaintiff could not possibly get to and from his
property, or that others could not do so.... But a property owner is entitled to a
safer and more convenient use of an abutting street than that. He is entitled to have
it not materially obstructed."12
Missouri cases indicate numerous instances where interference with a property
owner's reasonable enjoyment of his property will be regarded as a nuisance and
enjoined as such. Unreasonable public parking in front of the owner's property, in
line with the limitations on the use of public streets recognized in other Missouri
cases, fits into this concept of nuisance. Thus one finds ample justification for the
belief that Missouri courts, should the occasion arise, will follow the lead of the
Massachusetts decision and find that extended and recurring parking in front of
another's property falls within the nuisance field and can be enjoined.
EasoN CARTER BonN
REFORMATION OF DEEDS FOR OMISSION-MUTUAL MISTAKE
Zahner v. Klump'
Grantees sued in equity to reform a deed to include a 7.86-acre tract allegedly
omitted from the deed by mutual mistake. The grantor, now deceased, listed his farm
with a broker for its sale. Grantees dealt only with the broker. The broker testified
that the entire farm was for sale, and that the grantor had said nothing about
keeping part of it. As the land was described in four deeds, the broker had an ab-
stractor draft the deed and describe the land in one deed. Some twelve years after
the deed was delivered and recorded the grantees sought to convey an easement over
the tract in question. It was then they discovered that the 7.86-acre tract had been
omitted from the deed. The grantees then communicated with the abstractor who
said he would try to straighten out the matter. He attempted to do this by securing
quitclaim deeds from the heirs of the grantor for the tract in question, but the
grantor's widow and child refused to execute them. As a result the grantees brought
this action. There was further testimony that a check of the records of the county
assessor and collector indicated there was no land other than the farm assessed to the
10. See Schopp v. St. Louis, 117 Mo. 131, 135, 22 S.W. 898 (1893); Zimmerman v.
Metropolitan St. Ry., 154 Mo. App. 296, 301, 134 S.W. 40, 42 (K.C. Ct. App. 1911).
11. See note 10 supra.
12. Zimmerman v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 154 Mo. App. 296, 301, 134 S.W. 40, 41-42
(K.C. Ct. App. 1911).
1. 292 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. 1956).
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grantor at the time of the conveyance. The Supreme Court of Missouri allowed the
deed to be reformed to include the 7.86 acres.
For reformation of a written instrument a prior agreement between the parties
must be established2 and a mistake in reducing that agreement to writing.3 The
establishment of such agreement has in some cases required proof that is clear,
cogent, and convincing; 4 other cases required that the proof need not be beyond a
reasonable doubt;5 while others required proof such as to leave no reasonable doubt
either as to the mistake or its mutuality.6 In City of Warsaw v. Swearngin,7 decided
November 12, 1956, the Supreme Court of Missouri used language indicating that
the proof be beyond a reasonable doubt. In any event, the testimony of the broker
and abstractor and the action of the abstractor in securing quitclaim deeds to the
land in question satisfies any of these tests.
As previously stated reformation depends on the establishment of a prior agree-
ment between the parties, but here one of the parties is deceased and the action
is against his heirs. This in itself will not preclude reformation,8 for if the prior
agreement is established equity will reform the writing not only between the original
parties, but also those that claim in interest under them. Included among these are
heirs, assigns, personal representatives, grantees, and purchasers with notice. 9
The agency of the scrivener has been a source of difficulty in an action for
reformation. It has been stated that where the scrivener, in drawing the instrument,
acts as the agent of only one of the parties the mistake is not mutual, but unilateral
and in such case reformation will be denied.' 0 In the instant case, however, and
also in City of Warsaw v. Swearngin" the test for reformation is the establishment
of the prior differing agreement of the parties. Where this is done the agency of
the scrivener is deemed unimportant. In fact his agency is a controlling factor only
when his mistake is the sole basis for pleading mutual mistake.1 2
2. Feeler v. Gholson, 71 S.W.2d 727 (Mo. 1934).
3. Wilhite v. Wilhite, 284 Mo. 387, 224 S.W. 448 (1920).
4. General Refractories Co. v. Sebek, 328 Mo. 1143, 44 S.W.2d 60 (1931).
5. Maze v. Boehm, 281 Mo. 507, 220 S.W. 952 (1920).
6. Stephens v. Stephens, 183 S.W. 572 (Mo. 1916).
7. 295 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. 1956). City of Warsaw sought to have its title to certain
lands established and enjoin Swearngin from trespassing on the land in question.
Swearngin contended he took the land by warranty deed from one Lay, and Lay
should bear any loss suffered by Swearngin. Lay alleged that if the deeds included
the land in controversy they did not embody the agreement between Swearngin and
him, and were the result of mutual mistake. Lay sought reformation on this ground,
and the court allowed it, establishing title in the city.
8. Phillips v. Cope, III S.W.2d 81 (Mo. 1937); Hagman v. Shaffner, 88 Mo. 24
(1885).
9. St. Louis 221 Club v. Melbourne Hotel Corp., 227 S.W.2d 764 (St. L. Ct. App.
1950).
10. Hood v. Owens, 293 S.W. 774 (Mo. 1927); Dougherty v. Dougherty, 204 Mo.
228, 102 S.W. 1099 (1907).
11. See note 7 supra.
12. City of Warsaw v. Swearngin, supra note 7.
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The grantee's laxity in not inspecting the deed until some years later raises the
question of whether he should be precluded from reformation on some type of estoppel
theory. Mere failure of inspection is not of itself a sufficient reason for denying
reformation. The court indicates, however, that where the grantee was grossly
negligent in failing to examine the deed, or the grantor was injured by the grantee's
delay in discovering the mistake, the grantor may preclude reformation by showing
such injury and pleading laches.13 Also the lapse of time between the issuance of
the deed and discovery of the mistake will not without more preclude reformation.
In Lauffer v. Smith14 a delay in bringing an action for reformation was excused
because of lack of knowledge of the mistake and prompt bringing of the action after
its discovery. Here too, however, the court intimates that should there be more than
a mere lapse of time, such as injury to the other party resulting from the delay, the
one seeking reformation may be barred.
In reformation cases since a writing is to be altered by oral testimony the parol
evidence rule presents a problem. As a general rule oral evidence may not be used
to alter a written instrument.15 However, it seems to be the rule in Missouri that
mistake establishes an exception to the general rule,16 and oral testimony is admissi-
ble to vary the terms of the written instrument.
In the principal case reformation is sought in order to conform the deed to the
oral agreement of the parties. Since an oral agreement concerning the sale of land
is involved, a question arises whether the statute of frauds would be a defense.
Tucker v. Dolan17 indicated it would not. In that case a verbal agreement for the
sale of land was made and a deed executed. The court held that the delivery of the
warranty deed removed the sale from the statute of frauds. The removal of the case
from the statute of frauds was bolstered by the fact that the grantee had taken posses-
sion of the land. The same situation prevails in the instant case.
In conclusion it appears that the right to reformation of a written instrument
based on mistake is predicated on the establishment of a prior agreement between
the parties and the failure of the written instrument to embody the terms of that
agreement. Once such agreement is established, by whatever standard of proof re-
quired, the written instrument will be reformed to coincide with the original agree-
ment of the parties.
GUSTAV J. Lmmn
13. McCormick v. Edwards, 351 Mo. 1017, 174 S.W.2d 826 (1943).
14. 337 Mo. 22, 85 S.W.2d 94 (1953).
15. Bellows v. Porter, 201 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1953).
16. Miller v. Haberman, 359 Mo. 1012, 1017, 224 S.W.2d 1002, 1005 (1949) ("The
rule precluding the consideration of extrinsic evidence of the intention of the parties
to a deed as stated in the case of Rummerfield v. Mason, supra, is not applicable in
the case wherein relief is sought on the ground of mistake." (Emphasis added));
McCormick v. Edwards, supra note 13; Employers' Indemnity Corp. v. Garrett, 327
Mo. 874, 38 S.W.2d 1049 (1931).
17. 109 Mo. App. 442, 84 S.W. 1126 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905).
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TORTS-LIABILITY OF AIR CARRIERS FOR INJURIES TO
PASSENGERS CAUSED BY TURBULENCE DURING FLIGHT
Cudney v. Braniff Airways, Inc.'
Plaintiff was thrown from her seat and injured when defendant-air-carrier's
airplane, in which she was riding as a passenger, encountered a severe downdraft
while flying through a storm. Plaintiff alleged defendant's pilot was negligent in
flying through the storm. At the first trial of the case, plaintiff attempted to use
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to make out her case.2 The MIssouri supreme court
held res ipsa loquitur was not applicable in this type of situation, but remanded the
case so that the plaintiff might plead specific negligence. At the second trial, plaintiff
submitted her case for specific negligence and had the verdict, but judgment was
directed for defendant. On appeal, held, reversed. The court held that failure by an
air carrier to take precautions, shown to have been available, to guard against the
hazards of dangerous turbulence of which it had been forewarned by scientific
weather information, constituted negligence.
The principal case involves a type of injury which has been the subject of very
little litigation. Contrary to the experience of railroad and motor carriers, air carriers
have not been hampered by large numbers of personal injury suits arising from
injuries incurred by passengers during transit. Such injuries during air transit are
usually caused by turbulence of the air, and may be classified generally with the
railroad jolt, jar, and jerk cases.5
A major difference between a railroad and an air jerk or jolt case is that the
plaintiff is not given the benefit of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the air cases
as he is in the surface cases. 4 Consequently, he must plead and prove specific
negligence on the part of the carrier in order to recover.
The duty of care owed by the air carrier to its passengers is the same as for
carriers in general-to exercise the highest degree of care consistent with the practi-
cal operation of the plane and the protection of its passengers. 5 While the law
demands a high degree of care for the safety of passengers, it does not require the
air carrier to exercise all the care, skill, and diligence of which the mind can con-
ceive nor such as will relieve passengers from all possible perils.6 The carrier is not
an insurer of the safety of its passengers, but is only liable for negligence.
1. 300 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. 1957).
2. Cudney v. Midcontinent Airlines, Inc., 363 Mo. 922, 254 S.W.2d 662 (1953)
(en banc). Between the two trials of this case, Midcontinent Airlines was merged
with Braniff Airways and the latter corporation assumed the liabilities of, and was
substituted as defendant in place of, Mdidcontinent.
3. Barwick and Richardson, Aviation Tort Cases-Exclusive of Major Disaster
Situations, 22 INs. CouNsEL J. 68, 72 (1955).
4. Cudney v. Mlidcontinent Airlines, Inc., supra note 2, at 930, 254 S.W.2d at
667. See also Note, 18 Mo. L. REv. 326 (1953).
5. Urban v. Frontier Air Lines, 139 F. Supp. 288, 289 (D. Wy. 1956); Kimmel v.
Pennsylvania Airlines & Transport Co., 8 J. Am L. 272 (1937); 6 Amd. JUR., Aviation §
51 (1950).
6. Kimmel v. Pennsylvania Airlines & Transport Co., supra note 5; 6 Awt. JuR.,
Aviation § 51 (1950).
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The difficulty which the plaintiff has historically faced in attempting to recover
from the air carrier for injuries caused by turbulence will be illustrated by a con-
sideration of two early cases in this field. The case of Hope v. United Air Lines, Inc.,7
decided in 1936, is a case very similar to the principal case on its facts. The plaintiff-
passenger allegedly received injuries by being thrown around in her seat as a
result of defendant-carrier's negligence in flying through rough weather. No expert
witnesses were used by plaintiff, who relied mainly on her own story of what hap-
pened. The defendant's evidence contradicted that of plaintiff on all vital points.
Yet the trial judge ruled that plaintiff had made out a case sufficient to go to the
jury.8 The jury found for the defendant, showing that it was not willing to accept
the generalized, inexpert story of the passenger as opposed to the more expert and
detailed evidence presented by the airline in its own defense.
In the case of Kimmel v. Pennsylvania Airlines & Transport Co.,9 decided in 1937,
the defendant-carrier's plane, on which plaintiffs were riding as passengers, en-
countered a severe downdraft and plaintiffs were thrown from their seats and in-
jured. Negligence was alleged in that the pilot could and should have averted the
injuries by warning the passengers to fasten their seat belts before the downdraft
was encountered. The state of the evidence is not clear in the report of the case, but
it does not appear that plaintiffs made use of expert witnesses, although weather
reports were in evidence. The question for the jury to decide was whether the pilot
should have foreseen the adverse weather conditions and warned the passengers
of them in the exercise of the degree of care the law imposed upon him. As in the
preceding case, the jury found for the defendant-carrier.
In contrast to these unsuccessful efforts of plaintiffs to recover for injuries from
turbulence, two more recent cases and the principal case illustrate that it is possible
for a plaintiff to make out a case without the aid of res ipsa loquitur.
Small v. Transcontinental and Western Air, Inc.,10 decided in 1950, again in-
volved the charge of failure of the pilot to warn passengers to fasten their seat belts.
The plaintiff showed that the weather became rough, but that the "Fasten Seat Belt"
sign was not turned on. Then a severe downdraft was encountered, causing plaintiff
to be thrown to the floor and injured. Defendant's pilot and co-pilot testified that
there was no need for the sign to be illuminated before the drop because the flight
was smooth and routine, and that they had no notice of adverse flying conditions.
In finding for the plaintiff, the jury accepted the passenger's evidence of the flight
conditions over the contrary testimony of the pilots.
A more recent case is that of Urban v. Frontier Air Lines,1 1 decided in 1956,
in which the passenger charged that while the "Fasten Seat Belt" sign was on, the
7. 8 J. AR L. 132 (1937).
8. See Note, 8 J. AiR L. 139 (1937) (criticizing this case as an application of
the so-called mild form of res ipsa Zoquitur).
9. 8 J. Am L. 272 (1937).
10. 96 Cal. App. 2d 408, 216 P.2d 36 (1950).
11. 139 F. Supp. 288 (D. Wy. 1956).
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stewardess gave her permission to leave her seat to go to the lavatory, and that
while she was out of her seat, the plane hit a downdraft causing plaintiff to fall and
break her ankle. Plaintiff alleged that the stewardess was negligent in granting such
permission. There was much conflicting evidence as to whether the stewardess had
in fact given the permission alleged. Defendant contended that plaintiff assumed the
risk of leaving her seat during rough weather. Judgment was for plaintiff. The
district judge in his opinion stated that the defense of assumption of risk might
have been valid during the earlier development of air travel, but that considering
its present development, "it can no longer be said that a passenger entering upon
the modem commercial plane voluntarily assumes a risk with respect to the plane
itself or its operation."'12 In concluding that the stewardess was negligent in granting
permission for plaintiff to leave her seat under the existing conditions, the judge
said, "that a reasonable and prudent person would have known or should have
known that rough and turbulent weather would have likely reoccurred before plain-
tiff returned to her seat."13
There is thus some indication that in later cases courts may be more prone to
find the air carrier negligent where a passenger receives injuries from turbulence.
The principal case is important in that it shows what detailed facts a plaintiff can
prove in support of his charges of specific negligence. The plaintiff in the principal
case was able to show the following: (1) the weather forecast given to the pilot
before take-off; (2) the actual weather conditions encountered before the sudden
lurch; (3) the weather conditions gave warning of the likelihood of encountering
downdrafts on the course the plane was following; (4) it was the custom of pilots
to avoid flying through such conditions as were forecast, or, if necessary to fly
through them, to reduce speed; (5) the pilot had discretion to deviate from course
and to reduce speed to avoid the hazards from such conditions; (6) the pilot neither
attempted to circumnavigate the stormy area, nor reduced speed; (7) plaintiff's seat
belt was fastened in accordance with defendant's instructions; (8) the seat belt
became unfastened (apparently from the motion of her hands from being thrown
about during the storm); (9) plaintiff was thrown from her seat and injured; and
(10) after encountering the downdraft the pilot did reduce speed and veer off
course and in a few minutes was out of the storm.
Considering the advances which have been made in the fields of aircraft design,
electronics (particularly radar) and meteorology, with the knowledge and fore-
warning of adverse flying conditions they afford, no longer does it seem too much
to require air carriers to exhaust all the means available to detect extreme weather
conditions, and to take steps by way of warnings and changes of course to protect
passengers from the hazards of these turbulent conditions.
VINVM E. CArNAUAMr
12. Id. at 289.
13. Id. at 290.
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TORTS-WIFE'S LIABILITY TO HER HUSBAND
FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
Leach v. Leach1
Action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained through the alleged
negligence of the defendant. Plantiff and defendant were husband and wife, and,
on the ground that a husband could not sue his wife, the trial court sustained de-
fendant's demurrer to the complaint. On appeal, held, reversed. The court held that
a husband has a right to sue his wife in tort for personal injuries.
Most jurisdictions have adopted the common law rule and have not allowed the
spouses to sue inter se for personal torts.2 The reason given for this disability at
common law was that the husband and wife were one person; that the husband was
that one person; and that the wife, having no legal identity, could neither sue nor
be sued.3 It would seem that the married women's acts have destroyed this unity-
of-person concept. However, the courts following the majority view have refused to
construe these acts as abrogating the common law rule.4 The considerations are that
the spouses already have an adequate remedy in a criminal proceeding or in an
action for divorce;5 that to allow the spouses to sue each other would be to encourage
fraudulent claims;6 that if such a change is to be wrought in the law it should
be by specific legislation and not by judicial interpretation;7 and finally and most
important, that the common law rule is necessary to preserve domestic harmony in
the home.8
1. 300 S.W.2d 15 (Ark. 1957).
2. PnossER, ToRTs § 101 (2d ed. 1955); 27 Am. JuR., Husband and Wife § 589
(1940); 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife § 396 (1944); Annots., 43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955);
160 A.L.R. 1406 (1946); 89 A.L.R. 118 (1934); 33 A.L.R. 1406 (1924); 29 A.L.R. 1482
(1924); 6 A.L!R. 1038 (1920).
3. Laughlin v. Eaton, 54 Me. 156 (1866); Stockton v. Farley, 10 W. Va. 171
(1877); 1 BxAccsroNE, CommwTAams *442.
4. Heyman v. Heyman, 19 Ga. App. 634, 92 SE. 25 (1917); In re Dolmage's
Estate, 203 Iowa 231, 212 N.W. 553 (1927); Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 239 P.2d 933
(1952); Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W. 297 (1927).
5. Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 Pac. 219 (1909); Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me.
304 (1877); Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177 S.W. 382 (1915).
6. Lubowitz v. Taines, 293 Mass. 39, 198 N.E. 320 (1936); Harvey v. Harvey,
239 Mich. 142, 214 N.W. 305 (1927); Newton v. Weber, 119 Misc. 240, 196 N.Y. Supp.
113 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
7. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Cubbison v. Cubbison, 73 Cal.
App. 2d 437, 166 P.2d 387 (1946); Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152
(1952); Karalis v. Karalis, 213 Minn. 31, 4 N.W.2d 632 (1942); Willott v. Willott, 333
Mo. 896, 62 S.W.2d 1084 (1933); Comstock v. Comstock, 106 Vt. 50, 169 Atl. 903 (1934).
8. Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774 (Fi. 1950). In this case the court said at
p. 776: "When one ponders the effect upon the marriage relationship were each
spouse free to sue the other for every real or fancied wrong springing even from
pique or inconsequential domestic squabbles, one can imagine what the havoc would
be to the tranquility of the home." See also Holman v. Holman, 73 Ga. App. 205, 35
S.E.2d 923 (1945); Sink v. Sink, supra note 4; Rogers v. Rogers, supra note 5; Wright
v. Davis, 132 W. Va. 722, 53 S.E.2d 335 (1949).
Many courts following this reasoning as to personal torts nevertheless allow the
spouses to sue each other to protect their respective property rights. See Annots.,
109 A.L.R. 882 (1937); 41 A.L.R. 1054 (1926).
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A minority of jurisdictions allow the spouses to sue each other with impunity.9
It is this group of decisions that the principal case follows.
The court in the principal case treated the problem as being one primarily of
construing their married women's act. This act uses rather broad language: "Every
married woman... shall have all the rights ... to sue and be sued ... as though
she were a femme sole... !'1o It was the court's belief that, since the statute in
"explicit" terms had made the wife vulnerable to a suit by her husband, it only
remained for them to follow the wishes of the legislature and to permit such an
action.
In Fitzpatrick v. Owens,"- which was decided by the Arkansas supreme court
forty years before the principal case, it was held that this same statute gave the
wife a right to sue her husband for negligence and that
"... it would be doing violence to their [the legislature's] manifest pur-
pose to further apply the rule of restriction on account of the statute being
in derogation of the common law.... We have ... nothing to do with the
policy of the law; for that is controlled entirely by the legislative branch of
government. It cannot be said that there is any such fixed policy on the
subject that the Legislature has not the power to change."12
The same reasoning was used in the principal case in overruling the defendant's
demurrer and holding that a husband can sue his wife. This is so, it was declared,
because "There can be no sound basis for a different conclusion when the shoe is
on the other foot....,,13
Other courts adopting the minority rule have similarly construed the married
women's act of their respective state as abrogating the common law rule.14 Missouri,
however, with a statute' 5 embodying broad language similar to the Arkansas statute,
has refused so far to adopt this construction.' 0
9. Bennett v. Bennett, 224 Ala. 335, 140 So. 378 (1932); Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo.
19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935); Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 126 Conn. 146, 9 A.2d 812 (1939); Lorang
v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 773 (1949);. Combs v. Combs, 262 S.W.2d 821 (Ky.
App. 1953); Priddle v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 100 N.H. 63, 119 A.2d 97 (1955);
Jacobs v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 2 Misc. 2d 428, 152 N.Y.S.2d 128(Sup. Ct. 1956); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932); Damm
v. Elyria Lodge No. 465, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952); Courtney v.
Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1939); Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129, 166 S.E.
101 (1932); Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941); Taylor v. Patten,
2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954).
10. ARK. STAT. AN. § 55-401 (1947).
11. 124 Ark. 167, 186 S.W. 832 (1916).
12. Id. at 176, 186 S.W. at 835.
13. 300 S.W.2d at 17.
14. Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917); Rains v. Rains, supra note
9; Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. App. 1953); Courtney v. Courtney, supra
note 9.
15. § 451.290, RSMo 1949 ("A married woman shall be deemed a femme sole
so far as to enable her ... to sue and be sued .. ").
16. Mullally v. Langenberg Brothers Grain Co., 339 Mo. 582, 98 S.W.2d 645(1936); Willott v. Willott, 333 Mo. 896, 62 S.W.2d 1084 (1933); Rogers v. Rogers, 265
Mo. 200, 177 S.W. 382 (1915); Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 231 Mo. App. 276, 96 S.W.2d
1082 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936).
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The dissenting opinion in the principal case took the same view as the Oregon
courts' 7 in contending that the spouses should be able to sue each other for inten-
tional torts but not for unintentional torts. As to intentional torts the judge agreed
that when one spouse intentionally injures the other, the harmony of the marital
relationship is so broken that it will remain so even though the injured spouse is
not allowed to sue; thus for intentional torts he thought that there was no good
reason to bar a suit. But as to unintentional torts, he saw only two possible results,
both of which he considered as being against public policy: (1) if the wife is financi-
ally independent, the husband will sue her, thus destroying the tranquillity of their
marriage; or (2) if the family has personal liability insurance, it would open the
gate for unscrupulous couples to "make a joint raid upon an insurance company."
Admitting there are valid arguments against letting the spouses sue each other
as a matter of policy, the fact remains that the legislature has declared by the
married women's act what policy shall be. And when the legislature has determined
the policy that a married woman shall be able to sue and be sued as if she were a
feme sole, the common law considerations against such actions no longer apply.'
8
Speaking of this in Thompson v. Thompson,' 9 Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, said:
2
o
"I repeat that with the policy, wisdom, or justice of the legislation in
question this court can have no rightful concern. It must take the law as it
has been established by competent legislative authority. It cannot, in any legal
sense, make law, but only declare what the law is, as established by competent
authority."
TED M. HENSON, JR.
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE--INJUNCTION-RIGHTS OF
MEMBERS OF LICENSED PROFESSIONS TO ENJOIN
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
Delaware Optometric Corporation v. Sherwoodl
Plaintiffs, a corporation made up of twenty-four out of the twenty-seven licensed
optometrists in Delaware, and three individual optometrists, brought suit to enjoin
defendant opticians from fitting contact lenses, an act of optometry for which
defendants were not licensed. Plaintiffs' contention was that the Delaware optometric
law2 conferred upon them as licensed optometrists a franchise or property right
17. See Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955); Apitz v. Dames, 205
Or. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955).
18. See Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts, 10 CALIF.
L. REv. 461, 471-80 (1922); Farage, Recovery for Torts Between Spouses, 10 IND. L.J.
290 (1935).
19. 218 U.S. 611 (1910) (Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Hughes concurred
in the dissent).
20., Id. at 623.
1. 128 A.2d 812 (Del. 1957).
2. Dn. CODE c. 24, §§ 2101-2119 (1953).
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comparable to a lawyer's license. According to plaintiffs' argument this property
right afforded optometrists, like attorneys, protection from unauthorized competition.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. 3 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware
affirmed. The unauthorized practice of a licensed profession, including law, can not
be enjoined on the theory that the injunction is to protect a property right. The
court based its ruling on an interpretation of the Delaware optometric law 4 which was
construed as having been enacted for the benefit of the public as a protection from
incompetent practitioners. This law establishes a board of examiners to recommend
applicants for licensing and to regulate the practice generally. 5 Unlicensed practice
is made a criminal offense to be prosecuted by the attorney general.6 The court was
unable to find in the law any grant of a property right entitling optometrists to be free
from unlicensed competition.
The court went one step further and said that a lawyer has no property right in
his license. This conclusion resulted from a review of the historical development of
the legal profession as compared to optometry. The legal profession was created as
a result of the need to protect the public from incompetence and to promote the
administration of justice. Financial gain to the licensed attorney is only incidental
to the real purpose of the regulation. The Delaware court referred, however, with
apparent approval, to a recent New Jersey decision which held that while the
individual lawyer was without standing to enjoin unauthorized practice on a property
right theory, the state bar association, suing on behalf of the public, was able to do
so. 7 The concurring opinion took the position that the majority unnecessarily ruled
on the status of the attorney's license, distinguishing the practice of optometry from
that of law and contending that such an important question as the nature of the
attorney's rights in his license should not have been resolved in this case when it
was only incidental to the main issue.
Dworken v. Apartment House Owners' Assn of Cleveland8 was an early and
important case in this area. There, the Ohio Court of Appeals sustained an individual
attorney's request for injunctive relief from unauthorized practice of law on the
ground that he had a property right in his license to practice. Since then, numerous
injunctions have been granted to restrain the unauthorized practice of various
3. Delaware Optometric Association v. Sherwood, 122 A2d 424 (Del. Ch. 1957).
4. See note 2 supra.
5. DEL. CODE c. 24, § 2102 (1953).
6. DEL. CODE c. 24, § 2119 (1953).
7. New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N. J. Mortgage Associates, 22N.J.2d 184, 123 A.2d 498 (1956) (action by the state bar association and five individual
plaintiffs to enjoin the defendant from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law).
It was held that the rights enjoyed by attorneys are only incidental to the public
welfare and that the individual lawyers have no basis for complaint of irreparable
injury to themselves through unauthorized practice in the absence of special injuries.
As a class, however, attorneys were held to be in a position to discover violators and,
through their bar association, perform the public function of prosecuting them.
8. 38 Ohio App. 265, 176 N.E. 577 (1931).
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professions on a plaintiffs contention that he was protecting his property rights.9
This theory has met with considerable opposition.0 Apparently, in Missouri a licensed
member of a profession, including the legal profession, cannot, either individually or
through representation by the professional association, obtain an injunction against
unauthorized practice on the ground that there is a property right to be protected. 1
Courts denying injunctions to the individual practitioner or to the professional
association follow much the same reasoning employed by the Delaware court in the
instant case. These courts feel that the professional man has received his license by
statutory authorization in the interest of the public welfare and in the case of the
lawyer in the interests of the administration of justice. This gives the practitioner
no interest in the subject matter of an action concerning his license other than the
interest possessed by each member of the public. As he can show no special injury,
it must be left to the state to institute an action on a public nuisance theory,' 2 or
to prosecute for crime under the appropriate statute. Unauthorized practice of law,
being also a violation of the court's exclusive right to license, is a contempt of the
court's authority and so punishable.' 3
Arguments for injunctions are based on a practical analysis of the profession.
In Burden v. Hoover14 the court said that one holding a license to practice medicine
9. Burden v. Hoover, 9 M. 2d 114, 137 N.E2d 59 (1956) (chiropractors); Smith
v. llinois Adjustment Finance Co., 326 Ill. App. 654, 63 NXE.2d 264 (1945) (lawyers);
Seifert v. Buhl Optical Co., 276 Mich. 692, 268 N.W. 784 (1936) (optometrists);
Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254 N.W. 910 (1934) (lawyers).
10. New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N. J. Mortgage Associates, supra
note 7 (lawyers); MacBeth v. Gerber's, Inc., 72 RI. 102, 48 A.2d 366 (1946) (opto-
metrists); Mosig v. Jersey Chiropodists, Inc., 122 N.J.Eq. 382, 194 Atl. 248 (1937)
(chiropodists).
11. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 344 Mo. 932, 130 S.W.2d 945, 125 A.L.R. 1149
(1939) (action for declaratory judgment defining unauthorized practice of law as to
insurance adjustors). The state bar association filed a cross bill to enjoin the insurance
company from unauthorized practice. The court refused to grant the injunction.
Unauthorized practice is forbidden in order to protect the public interests. State ex rel.
Schneider's Credit Jewelers, Inc. v. Brackman, 260 S.W.2d 800 (St. L. Ct. App. 1953)
(information in nature of quo warranto filed by prosecuting attorney at the relation
of state board of optometry and individual optometrists for forfeiture of defendant's
charter for alleged illegal practice of optometry). Here the court held that the state
board of optometry had the special interest required to act as relator. The individual
optometrists acting for themselves and for others similarly situated, did not have the
requisite special interest. The licensing law was held to be for the benefit of society.
Missouri Veterinary Medical Ass'n v. Glisan, 230 S.W.2d 169 (St. L. Ct. App. 1950)
(action by the association to enjoin defendant from unlicensed practice of veterinary
medicine). The court said that the association had no property rights which would
enable it to enjoin unlicensed practice. Clark v. Reardon, 231 Mo. App. 666, 104
S.W.2d 407 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937) (contempt proceeding against defendant for the un-
authorized practice of law). It was held that restrictions on the practice of law are
not primarily for the benefit of the lawyer but are for the benefit of society.
12. 39 Az. Jun., Nuisances § 124 (1942).
13. Clark v. Reardon, supra note 11; Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile
Service Ass'n, 55 RI. 122, 179 Atl. 139 (1935).
14. 9 MI1. 2d 114, 137 N.E.2d 59 (1956) (action by five licensed chiropractors to
enjoin defendants from practicing chiropractic without being licensed). The court
held that this unlicensed practice was an infringement of the plaintiffs' rights for
which equitable relief could be secured.
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has a property right in that laws affecting him in his practice must satisfy due process
of law. Also, the license confers a franchise in that it gives the licensee a privilege
to do something the general public cannot do. Because the license to practice a pro-
fession is granted only for merit, it is, therefore, different from the ordinary regula-
tory license. Whether it be called a franchise, license, or privilege it should be pro-
tected as a valuable interest.
The Delaware court apparently wished to strengthen the dignity of the profes-
sions. To consider the license a property right would contradict the reasons which
caused professions to be created and make them into businesses. This approach might
be criticized as unrealistic when compared to the reasoning used in the Burden case.
The majority in the Delaware decision made no attempt to explain two cases ad-
mitted by the court to support plaintiff's position.15 These cases were dismissed by
the statement that the court declined to follow them.16 The court purported to inter-
pret the Delaware optometric law17 in accordance with the Restatement of Torts.13
But the statement in comment d of the Restatement section that the Delaware court
thought applicable, indicates that one of the purposes of the law may be to protect
the professional prestige and reputation of licensed members; if so, then unlicensed
practitioners are liable to those licensed. This would appear to question the correct-
ness of the Delaware decision. With the legal and optometric professions springing
from two separate sources, the courts and legislatures respectively, there is merit
in the idea expressed in the concurring opinion that attorneys' rights should not
have been considered along with the rights of licensed optometrists.
The Delaware case represents one of the two approaches to this problem. The
solution seems to depend upon whether the emphasis is placed on a narrow con-
struction of the appropriate statute granting the license or on a realistic analysis of
what the license means to the practitioner. Both the Delaware and New Jersey courts
offer relief at least to the lawyer through his bar association. Refusing to recognize
a similar right in other professions can be criticized. The effect of encroachment by
those not licensed is much the same in all professions. This effect should be given
greater recognition than it was in the Delaware case.19
WnLxA J. EsLpy
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW-ATTORNEYS-
DUTY OWED OTHERS THAN CLIENT TO USE CARE IN
PERFORMING FUNCTIONS OF AN ATTORNEY
Mickcel v. Murphy'
An action for $17,000.00 damages was commenced by a complaint alleging that
15. Ezell v. Ritholz, 188 S.C. 39, 198 S.E. 419 (1938); Seifert v. Bul Optical Co.,
276 Mich. 692, 268 N.W. 784 (1936).
16. 128 A.2d at 814.
17. DEL. CODE c. 24, §§ 2101-2119 (1953).
18. 3 RESTATEmmT, ToRTs § 710 (1938).
19. See 28 Am. Jum., Injunctions § 70 (1940).
1. 305 P.2d 993 (Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. Cal. 1957).
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the defendant, who was not a lawyer, "did advise regarding, draw, prepare and
notarize" an instrumnent purporting to be the will of plaintiff's husband and to give
her his entire estate, worth some $34,000.00 "and did not advise [the husband] that
a will required attestation thereto of two witnesses," because of which the husband died
intestate and plaintiff inherited only half the estate. Judgment sustaining a demurrer
to the complaint was affirmed. The court, after remarking that it was not clear from
the complaint that defendant undertook to do more than act as a scrivener at the
husband's dictation, held that, even if he did undertake to perform the function of a
lawyer in drafting and seeing to the execution of the will, defendant was not liable
for injuries caused by his mere ignorance or want of care to anyone except his client;
that the duty of care is owed only to the client and that a lawyer is not liable for
malpractice to third parties in the absence of fraud, collusion, malice or tort. It re-
jected a contention that liability could be predicated upon violation of a statute
making it a misdemeanor to practice law without a license.
It is well settled that an attorney is liable to his client for injuries caused by
failure to use ordinary care in performing his functions.2 By the great weight of
authority, before an attorney will be held liable for injuries caused by his failure
to use care, he must owe a duty to the person injured to use care, and that duty will
only arise as to persons with whom he holds some privity such as his client or other
person who employs him.-
In Buckley v. Gray4 it was specifically held that an attorney who was grossly
negligent in not drawing the will so as to correctly express the desires of the testatrix,
was not liable to a beneficiary who suffered a great pecuniary loss thereby. There
are numerous decisions that an attorney5 or an abstractor 6 is not liable to third
2. E.g., Re Fitzpatrick, 54 Ont. L. Rep. 3 (1923); see 5 Am. Jua., Attorneys at
Law, §§ 120, 124 (1936); 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, § 155 (1937); Annots., 45
A.L.R.2d 5 (1956), 43 A.L.R. 932 (1926) (liability of attorney for mistake or error in
drafting contract, will or the like).
3. National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1880); Jacobsen v. Overseas
Tankship Corp., 11 F.R.D. 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1950); Dundee Mortgage & Trust Investment
Co. v. Hughes, 20 Fed. 39 (C.C.D.O. 1884); Kendall v. Rogers, 31 A.2d 312 (Md. 1943);
Wlodarek v. Thrift, 13 A.2d 774 (Md. 1940) (liability of attorney in passing on validity
of title to land is founded on contract and not on tort); Dallas v. Fassnacht, 42
N.Y.S.2d 415 (Sup. Ct. 1943); In re Cushman, 95 Misc. 9, 160 N.Y. Supp. 661 (Surr.
Ct. 1916); see 3 SHEA MiA & REDELD, NEGLIGENCE § 584 at 1485 (rev. ed. 1941); Annots.,
45 A.L.R2d 5 (1956), 5 A.L.R. 1389 (1920).
4. 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895).
5. National Savings Bank v. Ward, supra note 3; Dundee Mortgage & Trust Co.
v. Hughes, supra note 3; Kendall v. Rogers, supra note 3; Wlodarek v. Thrift, supra
note 3; Gordon v. Livingston, 12 Mo. App. 267 (St. L. Ct. App. 1882) (liability of
grain inspector for negligent certification limited to person with whom he contracted);
see Annots., 34 A.L.R. 67 (1925) (liability of one making a certificate or report and
a third person relying thereon), 5 A.LR. 1389 (1920).
6. Talpey v. Wright, 61 Ark. 275, 32 S.W. 1072 (1895); Schade v. Gehner, 133
Mo. 252, 34 S.W. 576 (1896) (liability of examiner of title); Zweigardt v. Birdseye,
57 Mo. App. 462 (K.C. Ct. App. 1894); Thomas v. Guarantee Title & Trust Co., 81
Ohio St. 432, 91 N.E. 183 (1910); Equitable Building & Loan Ass'n v. Bank of Com-
merce & Trust Co., 118 Tenn. 678, 102 S.W. 901 (1907). Contra, Brown v. Sims, 22 Ind.
App. 317, 53 N.E. 779 (1899); Gate City Abstract Co. v. Post, 55 Neb. 742, 76 N.W.
471 (1898); Dickle v. Nashville Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S.W. 896 (1890). See
Annot., 34 A.L.R. 67 (1925).
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persons for negligence in failing to discover defects in or encumbrances on titles to
land that they were hired to investigate, although it has been held that an attorney
is liable to the mortgagee for negligence in title search, even when hired by the
mortgagor, when he knew it was for the benefit of the mortgagee.7
There is considerable authority for the proposition that an attorney without
actual knowledge of the malice, is not liable to third persons for suits maliciously
prosecuted by his client, even when the attorney should have known that the suit
was being maliciously prosecuted had he been exercising due care. If the attorney
had knowledge that the suit was malicious or colluded with the client in his wrong
doing, he would be liable to the third person.8
As to the liability of public accountants, it seems that the accountant only owes
a duty to use care as to the person who employs him0 although there are decisions
holding the accountant liable to third persons whom he knew would rely on his
financial statement.' 0
To the decisions holding that an attorney is only liable to his client for his
negligent acts and not to third persons who are injured by his failure to exercise the
reasonable care of a man in his profession, there is one well-recognized exception.
An attorney is liable to a third person who sustains an injury in consequence of his
wrongful act when the attorney has been guilty of fraud or collusion, or of a malci-
ous or tortious act. 1 The decisions seem to imply that "tortious," as used here,
means intentional or malicious. This exception, of course, would not apply to the
case at bar because there was no such malicious intent evidenced as to the beneficiary
of the will.
The recent case of Biakanja v. Irving 12 has somewhat weakened any precedent
established by the case at bar by holding on almost identical facts that a notary who
was negligent in drawing a will was liable to the legatee with whom he was not in
7. Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 Atl. 98 (1897).
8. Burnap v. Marsh, 13 Ill. 535 (1851); Roth v. Shupp, 94 Md. 55, 50 Ati. 430
(1901); Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947); Peck v. Chouteau,
91 Mo. 138, 3 S.W. 577 (1887); Staley v. Turner, 21 Mo. App. 244 (St. L. Ct. App.
1886); McMorris v. Howell, 89 App. Div. 272, 85 N.Y. Supp. 1018 (2d Dep't 1903);
Anderson v. Canaday, 37 Okla. 171, 131 Pac. 697 (1913); Langen v. Borkowski, 188
Wis. 277, 206 N.W. 181 (1925); see Annot., 43 A.L.R. 639 (1925).
9. See Annots., 74 A.L.R. 1153 (1931); 8 A.L.R. 462 (1920).
10. See Annots., 120 A.L.R. 1262 (1939); 74 A-L.R. 1153 (1931).
11. National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1880); Lackey v. Vickery, 57
F. Supp. 791 (W.D. Mo. 1944); First National Bank v. Broder, 107 Conn. 574, 141
Atl. 861 (1928); Ayres v. Smith, 227 Ind. 82, 84 NJE.2d 185 (1949); Rose v. Davis, 288
Ky. 674, 157 S.W.2d 284 (1941); U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Roberson, 142 So.
321 (La. App. 1932); Anderson v. Rubin, 286 Mass. 361, 190 N.E. 544 (1934); Rosen-
berg v. Cyrowski, 227 Mich. 508, 198 N.W. 905 (1924); White v. McCoy Land Co.,
101 S.W.2d 763 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937), affd, 341 Mo. 1004, 111 S.W.2d 18 (1937); Dallas
v. Fassnacht, 42 N.Y.S2d (Sup. Ct. 1943); In re Cushman, 95 Misc. 9, 160 N.Y. Supp.
661 (Surr. Ct. 1916); Thomas Fruit Co. v. Levergood, 135 Okla. 105, 274 Pac. 471
(1929); Haggerty v. Moyerman, 321 Pa. 555, 184 AUt. 654 (1936); Adelman v. Rosen-
baum, 133 Pa. Super. 386, 3 A.2d 15 (1938).
12. 310 P.2d 63 (Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist Cal. 1957).
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privity for injuries caused to the legatee by the notary's negligence. The case would
not seem to alter the proposition that an attorney is only liable to those with whom
he is in privity because the court seemed to rest the liability of the notary solely on
the basis of a violation of a statute defining the unauthorized practice of law.13
The court also distinguished the case of Buckley v. Gray14 by reiterating that that
case dealt with the liability of an attorney and this decision dealt with a layman
practicing law in violation of a statute which was intended to protect the public from
the practice of law by one other than a licensed attorney.15
The court also pointed out that the Mickel case16 was decided on the pleadings
and that this court was not going to follow the dicta in that case to the effect that
civil liability cannot be predicated upon the violation of an unauthorized-practice-of-
law statute, but instead this court based liability solely upon violation of that statute.
From an analysis of both cases, it appears that the feeling of the court in the
Biakanja case is contrary to that of the Mickel case on the problem despite its
attempt to distinguish the earlier decisions.
A rather anomalous situation is now before us in that the testator cannot recover
for injuries caused by the negligence of an attorney in drafting a will because he is
dead and the cases on the subject preclude the legatee from recovery because of
lack of privity. The court in Biakanja v. Irving recognizes this problem, but while
it is unable to overrule the decision of the state supreme court in Buckley v. Gray,
it does, by way of dictum, imply that an attorney should also be liable for an injury
caused to a legatee by the negligence of an attorney in drafting a will and giving
advice concerning it. In spite of this dictum, the great weight of authority seems to
limit an attorney's liability for negligence only to persons with whom he is in privity.
WUZ.AM M. HOWMW
13. CAL. Am. Bus. & PROP. CODE § 6125.
14. 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895).
15. 310 P.2d at 65.
16. 305 P.2d 993 (Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. Cal. 1957).
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